

<http://dx.doi.org/10.16926/sn.2025.21.01>

Received: 7.04.2025

Accepted: 30.06.2025

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## ON THE EMBODIED AND ADAPTIVE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPTS GOOD AND BAD

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**How to cite [jak cytować]:** Bierwiaczonk, B. (2025). On the embodied and adaptive origins of the concepts GOOD and BAD. *Studia Neofilologiczne. Rozprawy Językoznawcze*, 21, 13–39.

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### Abstract

This paper in an attempt to explain the bodily motivation of the basic evaluative terms GOOD and BAD in terms of human experiences (sensations) of pain and pleasure, based on the findings and theory of human emotions and feelings proposed by A. Damasio (1999). It is argued that the concepts GOOD and BAD may belong to a larger category of “basic adaptive concepts”, which developed from basic human needs and adaptations. The basic evaluative opposition GOOD – BAD is shown to be one of the crucial parameters of the domains of human emotions and values, which constitute two bases of evaluative predications, called, respectively, affective and value predicates. It is suggested that the domain of values has the structure of a hierarchy of values with each value represented as a scale showing bi-polar valences and their intensities.

**Key words:** embodiment, evaluation, adaptive concepts, pain, pleasure, emotion, affective predication, value predication, hierarchy of values, profiling.

### Introduction

According to Evans (2019), there two central assumptions of the cognitive linguistics approach to conceptual structure. Evans formulates these assumptions as follows:

- i) conceptual structure is embodied;
- ii) semantic structure reflects conceptual structure. (p.201)

Assumption (i) means that basic human concepts can be derived from bodily experiences. These experiences include the sensory perception of the external world, known as exteroception, and the perception of the internal world of bodily experiences, known as interoception. Thus, to quote Evans again, “the concepts we form, and the ways in which they become organised, arise as a direct consequence of the nature of our bodies, as we act in and interact with the world around us” (p.202).

The second main assumption of cognitive linguistics, formulated in (ii) above, says that semantic structure of language refers to concepts in the minds of speakers rather than to objects in the external world. This assumption has the important implication that conventional meanings of words and more complex expressions are equated with concepts symbolized by those words and expressions. In short, “meaning is conceptualization” (Langacker, 1987). An important part of most of those concepts is their evaluative good-bad load: based on our needs and system of values, we usually consider the entities, properties, and events in our world as good or bad. These evaluations are parts of conceptualizations but they are not parts of referents of those conceptualizations.

## 1 Embodied conceptual structure

The cognitive linguistic thesis of the embodiment of conceptual structure does not mean that all concepts are necessarily embodied or that they are all embodied to the same extent. A lot of abstract concepts like politics, infinity, proof, falsehood are not embodied, although they may be and usually are construed in terms embodied categories. In this section, we shall focus on the basic embodied concepts, which do not need such additional construing operations.

### 1.1 Minimal concepts

One set of such concepts are what Langacker (2008, p. 33) calls “minimal concepts”, which are profiled in specific experiential domains, e.g. LINE, ANGLE, and perhaps some basic shapes like STRAIGHT, CIRCLE, TRIANGLE, SQUARE, CUBE AND SPHERE in n-dimensional space, focal COLOURS in vision, PRECEDENCE and SIMULTANEITY in time, as well as “configurational concepts”, such as BOUNDARY, CONTACT, CONTINUITY, PROXIMITY. Based on bodily experiences, these concepts are used to think and talk about more abstract domains, e.g. the concept of STRAIGHT means ‘proper’ or ‘conventional’ in the domain of MORALITY (Cienki, 1998; Bierwiaczonek, 2004; Bierwiaczonek & Tamezoujt, 2010), while the concepts of PROXIMITY is used to denote INTERPERSONAL emotional RELATIONS, as in expressions *close friend* and *close relationship* (Kövecses 2000).

## 1.2 Image schemas

Another set of embodied concepts are so-called image schemas (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Cienki, 1997), i.e. imagistic representations of interactions between the human body and various categories of entities in space. For instance, the image schematic concept of CONTAINMENT is based on the common experience of a body moving into or out of a container, e.g. a room, and a common perception of objects or substances located inside or outside a container, e.g. milk being poured into or out of a bottle. However, the image schema of CONTAINMENT serves to construe non-physical entities as well, e.g. psychological states or situations, and thus makes it possible to talk about being *in/out of love*, *in/out of trouble*, *in/out of debt*. Another image schematic opposition is the opposition between UP and DOWN, based on perceptual experiences of objects situated in different points of the vertical axis and bodily experiences of rising and falling due to the force of gravitation.

Other image schemas discussed in the literature include FORCE, PATH, LINK, CENTRE-PERIPHERY and SCALE. The schema of SCALE is particularly important for evaluation because each evaluative predication and, hence, each value judgment may be located on the scale of GOOD or BAD. As Johnson (1987, p. 113) observes, “SCALARITY does seem to permeate the whole of human experience, even where no precise quantitative measurement is possible. Consequently, this experientially basic, value-laden structure of our grasp of both concrete and abstract entities is one of the most pervasive image-schematic structures in our understanding”.

## 1.3 Conceptual archetypes and event schemas

In addition to image schemas, there are a number of other concepts that arise from universal human perceptual, motor, and interpersonal experiences, which Langacker calls “conceptual archetypes” (Langacker, 2008, pp. 33–34). Examples of embodied conceptual archetypes are a physical object, the human body, the human face, holding something, seeing something, exertion of force, a face-to-face social encounter, etc. Those conceptual archetypes seem to be motivated by their perceptual and kinaesthetic commonness and universality and in this sense they are just another aspect of embodiment.

It seems that Langacker’s tentative list of conceptual archetypes may be extended to include what is known in cognitive syntax as “participant roles” and “event schemas” (Radden & Dirven, 2007; Bierwiazzonek, 2024).<sup>1</sup> Although the definite list of participant roles has not been established yet, it would have to comprise such roles as AGENT, THEME, PATIENT, RE-

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<sup>1</sup> While participant roles and event schemas are possibly universal, their syntactic representations, sometimes called “argument structure constructions” (cf. Goldberg 1995), but which could be also called and “basic event schema constructions” are language specific.

CEPIENT, BENEFACTIVE, INSTRUMENT, LOCATION, PROPERTY, and CATEGORY. The basic event schemas defined by those roles are certainly all the event schemas which Radden and Dirven ascribe to the Material and Force-Dynamic Worlds, as well as their Psychological World and the Social World, added by Bierwiaczonok (2024). The schemas are listed below:

### The Material World

A. Occurrence schemas:

States: THEME — PROPERTY/ CATEGORY/ IDENTITY/ REFERENCE POINT, e.g., *The story is be true, Joe is an actor, Joe resembles his father.*

Processes: THEME — (PROPERTY), e.g., *The plan has gone wrong, The sun is shining, It rained again.*

B. Spatial schemas: THEME — LOCATION, e.g., *Eve is in Warsaw*

C. Reference Point schema

Possession schema: POSSESSOR — THEME (POSSESSION), e.g., *Joe has a new car, He acquired his car in Sweden.*

WHOLE – PART, e.g., *The car has four wheels*

KINSHIP RP – RELATIVE (- THEME), e.g., *Bill has a cousin brother, This guy is Bill's brother.*

### The Force Dynamic World

A. Action schema: AGENT (DOER) — THEME, e.g., *Joe often breaks plates.*

B. Self-motion schema: AGENT (MOVER) — SOURCE/PATH/GOAL, e.g., *Eve went to Paris.*

C. Caused-motion schema: AGENT — THEME — GOAL, e.g., *Joe sent his books to New York.*

D. Transfer schema 1: AGENT — RECEIVER — THEME, e.g., *Eve often gives her kids presents.*

Transfer schema 2: AGENT — BENEFACTIVE — THEME, e.g., *Joe wrote a poem for Eve.*

### The Psychological World

The schemas involve different kinds of EXPERIENCER: SENSOR, EMOTER, PERCEIVER, AND COGNIZER

A. Sensation schema 1: SENSOR/SENSOR'S BODY PART, e.g., *My back is hurting.*  
Sensation schema 2: SENSOR — SENSATION, e.g., *Bill is sleepy, Bill feels disgust.*

B. Emotion schema 1: EMOTER — CAUSE, e.g., *Joe likes frogs, Frogs frighten Eve.*

Emotion schema 2: EMOTER — PROPERTY (EMOTION), e.g., *I'm furious, Eve is happy.*

- C. Perception schema: PERCEIVER — STIMULUS, e.g., *Eves sees her dog now, Joe heard that song before.*
- D. Cognition schema 1: COGNIZER — THEME (SUBJECT MATTER), e.g., *Eve still remembers that day, I'm dreaming of the white Christmas.*  
Cognition schema 2: COGNIZER — CONTENT, e.g., *Eve hopes Joe wins, Joe believes that his dad never lies.*

### The Social World

- A. SPEAKER – MESSAGE, e.g., *Eve said she was ill, Joe complained that he'd been cheated.*
- B. SPEAKER – ADDRESSEE – MESSAGE, e.g., *Eve told us that she was ill, Joe warned us that it might rain*

### 1.4 Basic domains

In cognitive semantics meanings of symbolic units construed as nominals, adjectives or verbs are represented as profiles in conceptual domains (Langacker, 1987). These conceptual domains form a network of domains linked by various relations and degrees of specificity, analysability, and internal complexity. The most general, unanalysable, and the simplest of those domains are considered to be “basic domains”. In fact, it is those basic domains that constitute the basis for all the concepts we have discussed so far, i.e. the minimal concepts, image schemas, and conceptual archetypes. As opposed to non-basic domains, which are often quite abstract, such as ALPHABET, CUISINE or DEMOCRACY, basic domains are all embodied. The “partial inventory of basic domains” proposed by Evans (2019, p. 405) include SPACE, TIME, COLOUR, PITCH, TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, PAIN, ODOUR, EMOTION. Given that PAIN and ODOUR are sensations, it seems reasonable to distinguish a basic domain of SENSATION (analogously to the general domain of EMOTION), which serves as basis for more specific concepts such as PAIN, PLEASURE, ODOUR, and TASTE, at least some of which may be classified as basic adaptive concepts discussed in the next section.

### 1.5 Basic adaptive concepts

Beside conceptual archetypes, there seem to be a number of fairly complex and fairly specific embodied concepts whose rise is motivated by the same force which actually motivated adaptive changes and modifications in human body itself. It is the well-known force of evolution of the human species empowered by two fundamental values of survival and procreation. In his discussion of the principles of evolutionary psychology, David M. Buss (2006/2015) pointed out that as the human body has thousands of organs with special functions, e.g. the heart for pumping blood or the lungs for inhaling oxygen, so the human mind has formed thousands of highly specific

mental mechanisms which in the long run enabled the homo sapiens to survive and expand. Although the rise of these mechanisms also depended on a bodily organ – the brain, its products were no longer physical. They involved what neuroscientists often call “the mental trilogy”, i.e. the interaction and integration of cognition, emotion and motivation (LeDoux, 2002: Ch.7). Although the processing of cognition, emotion and motivation is by and large unconscious, we are conscious of our thoughts and knowledge, of our emotions and feelings, and of our values and goals, which motivate our decisions. Since these systems as well as language which used them as concepts are adaptations,<sup>2</sup> they are not arbitrary but, like the bodily organs, they also serve, or at least used to serve, our survival and procreation. This means that there is a class of conceptual and lexical categories motivated by our evolutionary development and goals. These “basic adaptive concepts” (or, possibly “adaptive archetypes”), as I suggest to call them, have to do with our species specific needs and values. If we assume that Maslow (1943, 1970) was in general right in his analysis of basic deficiency and growth needs and agree that phylogenetically the deficiency needs, because of their role in biological survival, were conceptualized earlier and were more universal, because they were motivated by the universal aspects of the human organism, it is the concepts associated with those deficiency needs which are the primary adaptive concepts. In their final Maslow’s formulation (1970), these needs include: biological physiological and safety needs, and psychological belonging and esteem needs. These needs caused adaptations both on the biological, psychological and conceptual level. For instance, Buss (2006/2015) points out that in the early years of human life nothing was more important than the ability to distinguish properly what may be eaten from what may not and should be avoided. Consequently, adaptations to this fundamental activity include the ability to identify bad food by smell and taste, the basic emotion of disgust, and, in more extreme cases, vomiting, which prevents humans from digesting harmful substances.

The concepts that probably developed from those basic deficiency needs are HUNGER, THIRST, SLEEP, DANGER, SEXUAL DESIRE, along with their related activities, such as HUNTING (KILLING?), EATING, DRINKING, SLEEPING, FIGHTING, RUNNING and COPULATING, and related nominal categories, such as PREDATOR, FOOD, WATER, HOME, MATE, OFFSPRING, along with basic sensations like PAIN, PLEASURE, ODOUR, TASTE, emotions of HAPPINESS, SADNESS, FEAR, ANGER, SURPRISE and DISGUST, and basic oppositions like PRESENT – ABSENT, DEAD – ALIVE, BIG – SMALL, GOOD – BAD, DARK – LIGHT, QUICK – SLOW, STRONG – WEAK, COLD – WARM, etc.

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<sup>2</sup> The idea that language may be conceived as an adaptation was first formulated by Pinker and Bloom (1990) and then further developed by Pinker (1994) and (2003). Discussions of controversies and various versions of this thesis can be found in the papers in Christiansen and Kirby (2003).

## 1.6 Embodiment of GOOD and BAD

Damasio (1999) pointed out that there are two evolutionary functions of emotions. The first one is “the production of a specific reaction to the inducing situation” (p.53).<sup>3</sup> In animals, depending on “the inducing situation”, the reaction is to run, to freeze, to fight or to engage in some sort of pleasurable activity. The second function of emotions is to prepare the organism for the specific kind of reaction by regulating its internal state. Thus, emotions allow us to behave reasonably from the point of view of survival, i.e. to avoid or get rid of dangerous stimuli and to cherish valuable stimuli. To quote Damasio again:

At their most basic, emotions are part of homeostatic regulation and are poised to avoid the loss of integrity that is a harbinger of death or death itself, as well as to endorse a source of energy, shelter, or sex. And as a result of powerful learning mechanisms such as conditioning, emotions of all shades eventually connect homeostatic regulation and survival “values” to numerous events and objects in our autobiographical experience. Emotions are inseparable from the idea of reward and punishment, of pleasure or pain, of approach or withdrawal, of personal advantage and disadvantage. Inevitably, emotions are inseparable from the idea of good and evil” (pp. 54–55).

The only change that I believe should be made in the above quote is that the basic emotional evaluative distinctions are inseparable not only from the idea of good and evil, which restricts them to the moral domain, but from all kinds of axiological distinctions based on the scalar opposition of GOOD and BAD. Before we try to consider the possible development of this opposition, let us first see how Damasio views emotions and their evolution on different levels of life regulations.

Damasio distinguishes four such levels and what is crucial for our considerations is that at the level of “basic life regulation” there are no emotions but only “Relatively simple, stereotyped patterns of response, which include metabolic regulation, reflexes, the biological machinery behind what will become pain and pleasure, drives and motivations” (p.55). So the basic opposition is the opposition of “what will become” pain and pleasure, which categorize the inducing stimuli into “good” and “bad” ones, which are as Damasio argues, “intimately related to emotion”, in such a way that “While pain is associated with negative emotions, such as anguish, fear sadness, and disgust (...), pleasure is associated with many shades of happiness, pride and positive background emotions” (p.76). Beside their bi-polarity, what emotions inherit and share with the sensations of pain and pleasure is their scalarity: they are both gradable from low to high intensities. However, pain and pleasure “are not mirror image of each other”. Damasio remarks that, metaphorically, pain is like “putting a *body-guard* in front of the house while you

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<sup>3</sup> LeDoux (2002, p. 206) defines emotion as “the process by which the brain determines or computes the value of a stimulus.”

repair the broken window” (original italics, p. 78) – it informs of the damage inflicted in the past and allows it to be repaired. By contrast, pleasure “is all about forethought. It is related to the clever anticipation of what can be done not to have a problem” (original italics, *ibid.*). In other words, pain is avoided, while pleasure is sought.

Damasio argues that, gradually, the original sensations develop into emotions, conceived as “complex, stereotyped patterns of response”, such as six primary emotions, namely, happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust,<sup>4</sup> secondary (social) emotions, such as embarrassment, jealousy, guilt and pride, and, finally, background emotions, e.g. well-being or malaise, calm, and tension. That is the second level of life regulation. On the third level, as Damasio says, “sensory patterns signaling pain, pleasure, and emotions become images” (p.55), which may be interpreted as unconscious feelings. On the fourth level, i.e. the level of consciousness stemming from “a sense of self in the act of knowing” (p.282), these images and feelings become conscious and enable organisms to formulate complex and flexible plans of response which may be executed as behaviour.<sup>5</sup>

We may add that it is at this final stage of conscious feelings that the emotion and feeling concepts emerge, which constitute the basis for lexical categories associated with the sensations of pain and pleasure and more complex emotions as well as evaluations of various categories of stimuli causing those sensations and emotions. When coupled with cognitive representations of those categories of stimuli, the evaluations make it possible to behave adequately when confronted with those stimuli. It follows from Damasio’s theory that the basic evaluations are based on the binary opposition of plus (=causing pleasure) and minus (=causing pain) conceptualized as GOOD and BAD. As I already mentioned, the two oppositions of pleasure – pain and GOOD – BAD share their bi-polarity is: both pleasure and GOOD on the positive side, and pain and BAD on the negative are gradable.

As we pointed out above, most emotions are associated with pain or pleasure, therefore, these emotions are intrinsically evaluative. In the simplest and, perhaps, phylogenetically earliest terms, HAPPINESS is the emotion accompanying the sensation of pleasure, SADNESS is the emotion accompanying the loss of sensation of pleasure, FEAR is the emotion accompanying an

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<sup>4</sup> The theory of six basic emotions was first proposed by Ekman et al. (1969). Over the years the list was often expanded, both by Ekman himself (1999), who added contempt, and other researchers, e.g. Plutchnik (1980) added acceptance and anticipation. A short but clear and competent survey of those theories can be found in Kowalska and Wróbel (2017).

<sup>5</sup> The neural mechanism of the shift from emotion to feeling in terms of brain emotion-inducing sites, first-order neural maps, second order neural structures and changes in proto-self is discussed by Damasio (1999, p. 283).

ticipation of pain, ANGER is the emotion accompanying the sensation of pain directed at the inducer of that pain, and DISGUST is the emotion accompanying the sensation of the intense opposite of pleasure, particularly in the domain of TASTE.

## 2 Embodied concepts GOOD and BAD in the semantic structure of lexical units

The second main assumption of cognitive linguistics, formulated in (ii) above, says that semantic structure of language refers to concepts in the minds of speakers rather than to objects in the external world. This assumption has the important implication that conventional meanings of words and more complex expressions are equated with linguistic concepts symbolized by those words and expressions rather than objectively existing entities or categories of entities. In short, “meaning is conceptualization” (Langacker, 1987).<sup>6</sup> An important component of conceptualization is evaluation of the object of conceptualization in terms of one of the two basic evaluative concepts: GOOD or BAD.

### 2.1 GOOD and BAD in linguistics

The basic evaluative concepts of GOOD and BAD have been implicitly assumed in most linguistic semantic considerations and theoretical proposals. However, it was only in componential semantics and cognitive grammar that they found their place as fully explicit theoretical constructs.

#### 2.1.1 Componential semantics

Before the era of cognitive linguistics in the eighties and nineties of the 20th century, at the time of componential semantics, GOOD and BAD, along with ANIMATE, MALE, YOUNG, CAUSE, HAVE, etc. were considered as semantic components of meaning used in so-called semantic decomposition, i.e. representation of meaning of semantically complex expressions by means of increasingly more simple units of sense, referred to as “semantic markers”, “semantic primes” or “semantic primitives” (cf. Geeraerts, 2010 for a survey of those theories).

Fillmore’s analysis of the “verbs of judging” (1969) was one example of using evaluative components in lexical semantics. In particular, Fillmore

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<sup>6</sup> The cognitive approach to values put forward here is compatible with famous Wittgenstein’s quote “In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it, there is no value, - and if there were, it would be of no value.” (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) because it too implies that values are purely conceptual.

showed that the evaluative assessment of the situation in terms of GOOD or BAD is necessary in semantic representations in order to account for what he called “illocutionary level” of verbs like *criticize*, *scold*, *praise*, etc., in which the evaluation is asserted, and the “presuppositional level” of verbs like *accuse*, *apologize*, *credit*, etc., in which evaluation is presupposed.

According to Wierzbicka (1972, 1996, Wierzbicka & Goddard, 2004), the concepts of GOOD and BAD have lexemes in all languages in the world and, therefore, should be included in the universal “natural semantic meta-language”. GOOD, BAD, BIG, and SMALL are the only adjectives in the domain of EVALUATION and DESCRIPTION. For instance, in her critique of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) linguistic semantics, Wierzbicka (1986) represents the meaning of *love* as follows:

- (1) X loves (person) Y =  
 when X thinks of Y, X feels good feelings towards Y  
 X feels that he wants to be with Y  
 X feels that he wants to cause good things to happen to Y...

Another example of how GOOD is used in Wierzbicka’s explications is her representation of the meaning of *X feels happy* (Wierzbicka & Goddard, 2004):

- (2) “X feels happy” =  
 sometimes a person thinks something like this:  
 something good happened to me  
 I wanted this  
 I don’t want anything else  
 because of this, this person feels something good  
 X feels like this

Beside componential semantics, the concepts GOOD and BAD were also used extensively in studies of linguistic persuasion, esp. in the semantics and use of euphemisms and dysphemisms. For instance, Hayakawa (1947) proposed that there are “purr-words”, which are inherently positive, e.g. *golden*, *delightful*, *clean*, *save*, *success*, and there are “snarl-words”, which are inherently negative, e.g. *harmful*, *sick*, *dirty*, *mess*, *failure*, etc. Bolinger, in this classic *Language – the Loaded Weapon* (1980), distinguished several ways in which language expresses its users’ evaluations. The first one is the inherent evaluation of various aspects of the denoted concept, e.g., he explicates the meaning of the verb *to improve* as ‘to change in a direction *that is good*’ and the verb *to succeed* as ‘to have an outcome *that is good*’ (p. 80, emphasis original).<sup>7</sup> Another class of cases has to do with the form of performing a designated activity, e.g. protesting may be positive, while complaining expresses a negative evaluation because it implicates ‘protesting in a disgruntled way’.

<sup>7</sup> The corresponding negative verbs would be, respectively, *deteriorate* and *fail*.

Bolinger discussed also the degree to which the speaker identifies with the expressed attitude. For instance, in sentence (1) below the proposition *she is not well* is “BAD from ‘his’ viewpoint”, but not necessarily the speaker’s, while sentence (2) can only be construed as conveying the speaker’s positive judgment of the fact that the addressee could come.

- 1) He is sorry that she is not well
- 2) How nice that you could come

Finally, Bolinger points out that the evaluative load may also derive from what I called “axiological models” (Bierwiczzonek, 1990), i.e. socially approved stereotypes and prejudices, ranging from size, e.g., BIG IS GOOD, through race, e.g., BLACK IS BAD, to sexism, e.g. WOMAN IS BAD or WOMAN IS WORSE THAN MAN. For instance, he notes that most of the words for the concept of UNTIDY PERSON in Roget’s Thesaurus denote women – *slut, stattern, frump, drab, dowdy, draggletail, trollop, bitch* (p. 91).

### 2.1.2 Cognitive Linguistics

With the advent of cognitive linguistics, the objectivist semantics gave way to anthropocentric, experiential and embodied view of linguistic meaning, represented by Fillmore, Lakoff, Langacker and their students and followers. One of the important consequences of that change was emphasis on the viewpoint and construal as crucial aspects of linguistic meaning. Consequently, in opposition, to logic and formal semantics based on the concept of truth-conditions, Krzeszowski (1997, p. 12) proposed that “ ‘positive-negative’ rather than ‘true-false’ should be the most central opposition on which linguistic semantics ought to be based”. He adduced five arguments in support of his thesis. First, Osgood et al.’s (1957) studies of semantic differential revealed that the largest part of general variance between words is associated with the GOOD-BAD scale. Second, the distinction between GOOD and BAD is the first opposition that infants learn and communicate. Third, while the true-false distinction applies only to propositions, good-bad valuations may be predicated of individual entities or categories of things as well. Fourth, as shown by Coleman and Kay (1981), even in the meaning of the verb *lie* it is ‘the intention to deceive’, which is normally considered as morally bad, that is more important (central) than the falsehood of the proposition. Fifth, the concepts of GOOD and BAD are the most general hypernyms of other evaluative adjectives such as *beautiful* or *true*. Although Krzeszowski does not explicitly refer to the embodiment of the concepts of GOOD and BAD, he hints at it saying that “in English (and other languages) there is conventional possibility of referring to all pleasant qualities as *good* and to all unpleasant ones as *bad*” (p.14). For instance, he argues that the adjective *beautiful* describes “what pleases our sense of vision or hearing”

(ibidem). It follows that the concepts of GOOD and BAD originate in the bodily sensory sensation of pleasure.

Krzeszowski's proposal is appealing and intuitively attractive, but it should be modified in the light of the findings of modern neuroscience and evolution we discussed above: GOOD and BAD derive from the sensations of pleasure and pain and are further elaborated in the development of emotions and conceptualisations of values. Consequently, there are two kinds of evaluative predications: affective predications, based on emotions, and value-predications, based on different categories of values.

## 2.2 Evaluative predications

If evaluation may be based either on emotional reactions or on more rational judgments based on conceptualized human needs and values, it comes as no surprise that language has developed two groups of evaluative predications: affective predications (a-predications) denoting emotional attitude to the object of evaluation, e.g. verbs *like – dislike, love – hate, etc.* and adjectives *pleasant – unpleasant, enjoyable – depressing, etc.*, and value-predications (v-predications) denoting evaluations based on particular categories of values, e.g. nouns *wiseman – fool*, and adjectives *clever – stupid* in the domain of COGNITIVE values, nouns *beauty – ugliness*, adjectives *pretty – ugly* in the domain of AESTHETIC values, etc. The two categories of predications are discussed in greater detail below.

### 2.2.1 Affective predications

As pointed out above, most basic emotions have a relatively fixed evaluative charge and are often used to convey attitudes in the form of verbs, deverbal adjectives or causative verb + adjective construction, as in the BNC examples (3) – (9) below.

- 3) The topless Duchess **enjoys** a kiss and a cuddle with her Johnny
- 4) They were all very **enjoyable** and useful seminars.
- 5) The very idea of taking drugs **disgusted me**.
- 6) He would almost certainly have **felt disgusted** and perhaps angry, but would he have felt insulted?
- 7) The Eighties were a real musical void, it was **disgusting**.
- 8) But when you feel perfectly **happy** with something why change it?'
- 9) Small things would make **her happy**; one harsh word would send her into the depths of despair.

In a more recent attempt to analyse affective predicates in English, Martin and White (2005) also consider Affect, which is broadly synonymous with emotion and feeling, as one of the ways of expressing evaluation, along with

Judgment and Appreciation. However, contrary to standard psychological typologies, they suggest that four kinds of Affect should be distinguished: DESIRE, UN/HAPPINESS, IN/SECURITY, DIS/SATISFACTION. Interestingly from the point of view of conceptual and linguistic analysis, they describe each type of Affect in terms of the g-b polarity, basic emotional state, typical form of behaviour (“surge”) and “dispositions”, which are often linked to other more specific emotions and attitudes ordered according to their intensity from low, through median, to high. For instance, they represent the emotion of HAPPINESS and its opposite UNHAPPINESS as presented in Table 1.

Table 1  
*The emotion (“affect”) of UN/HAPPINESS*

UN/HAPPINESS	Surge	Disposition	Intensity
UNHAPPINESS			
Misery [mood ‘in me’]	whimper	down	low
	cry	sad	median
	wail	miserable	high
Antipathy [directed ‘at you’]	offend	dislike	low
	abuse	hate	median
	revile	abhor	high
HAPPINESS			
Cheer [mood ‘in me’]	chuckle	cheerful	low
	laugh	buoyant	median
	rejoice	jubilant	high
Affection [directed ‘at you’]	shake hands	be fond of	low
	hug	love	median
	embrace	adore	high

Source: adopted from Martin and White (2005, p. 49).

### **A note on SURPRISE**

The only intrinsically non-evaluative primary emotion is SURPRISE, which seems to have developed relatively late in evolution as, according to the most influential psychological theory of SURPRISE, known as Expectancy Violations Theory (EVT, cf. Burgoon & Jones, 1976; Burgoon, 2015), it presupposes “expectancy” concerning socially accepted norms of social, interpersonal, and personal behaviour. In cognitive terms, these norms are best described as Idealized Cognitive Models (Lakoff, 1987) or more specific mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1985) activated by the context. The fact that there is no constant evaluative valence for SURPRISE as such does not mean that violations of norms and expectations are not evaluated. The uniqueness of SURPRISE lies

in the fact that its evaluative valence always results from the context. Thus, as other forms of behaviour, a surprising behaviour is always considered, or rather felt, as positive or negative and often described as, respectively, *nice* or *great*, or *bad* or *nasty surprise*, as in the BNC (10) – (13) sentences below:

- 10) She fanned herself with a magazine.' What a **nice surprise**. We didn't expect you back yet.
- 11) He seemed to respond and even, to her **great surprise** and encouragement, took the first active part he had taken in any event for six months, preparing for the feast.
- 12) ... the dictatorship of Ceausescu has made so many mistakes that it may get a **bad surprise** in the parliamentary and presidential elections on May 20th.
- 13) So, do you want to keep your eyes shut while I get you up to the roof, or open them now and get a **nasty surprise** when you and all your millions of fans see where you are?"

## 2.2.2 Value-predications – GOOD and BAD in axiological domains

Beside emotions, the concepts of GOOD and BAD are immanently associated with the domain of human values: by definition, values are GOOD, while opposites of values are BAD. Minimally, satisfaction of values enables people to survive and procreate, maximally, satisfaction of values makes people feel satisfied or even happy. In cognitive semantics different categories of values provide access to domains which serve as conceptual bases of evaluative predications (Bierwiaczonek, 1993). There have been numerous attempts by philosophers, psychologists and linguists to specify those values. We shall discuss them in turn.

## 3 Values in philosophy and psychology

Because of their importance in human individual and social life and culture, values have been studied from a variety of perspectives. It seems that in order to understand the conceptual basis of evaluation in language, it is best to consider those perspectives which have studied values most systematically and proposed the most convincing categories and hierarchies of values. We find them in philosophy and in results of experimental research carried out by psychologists. Both these disciplines have provided valuable contributions to the typology and hierarchy of values in linguistics discussed in Section 4.

### 3.1 Values in philosophy

Probably the best known hierarchy of values in philosophy was proposed by Scheler (1913-16/1973) and adopted by Tischner (1984). The hierarchy distinguishes the following four types of values:

- a) SENSIBLE (HEDONISTIC) values<sup>8</sup> – based on such sensory dichotomies as pleasant v. unpleasant, comfort v. discomfort, etc.;
- b) VITAL values – centered around physical life and health such as strength and fitness, virility and pugnacity, etc., but also ability to cope with cold, strain and hardships, sturdy common sense, simple pragmatism, etc.;
- c) SPIRITUAL values– having to do with truth, goodness and beauty, presupposing the human subject's (i.e. "the person's") ability to make conscious decisions and choices, i.e. to be just or unjust, honest or dishonest, merciful and sympathetic or cruel;
- d) HOLY values – the domain of what is perfect, highest, absolute and eternal.

For Scheler and Tischner, the hierarchy is ordered from the lowest, most superficial and temporary HEDONISTIC values to the highest, most durable and profound, eternal HOLY ones (for most believers, Paradise is a place of eternal happiness). Note that the category of SPIRITUAL values comprises different areas of human mental activity, ranging from the search for the truth, decision-making, as well as the sense of beauty and morality.

### 3.2 Values in psychology

In psychology, values are usually defined as desirable goals which motivate decisions and action. Two prominent theories of values used in psychology are so-called Rokeach Value Survey (RVS) and Schwartz Theory of Basic Values.

#### 3.2.1 Rokeach Value Survey (RVS)

In Rokeach's system, known as the Rokeach Value Survey (1973), human values are divided into two groups of values: TERMINAL values and INSTRUMENTAL values. The 18 TERMINAL values specify the most fundamental desirable goals a person tries to achieve during their lifetime. The list of TERMINAL values consists of the following:

- |                    |                  |                 |
|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| 1) TRUE FRIENDSHIP | 2) MATURE LOVE   | 3) SELF-RESPECT |
| 4) HAPPINESS       | 5) INNER HARMONY | 6) EQUALITY     |

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<sup>8</sup> In what follows I will use big capitals for main categories of values and small categories for particular terminal or absolute values.

- |                       |                               |                       |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 7) FREEDOM            | 8) PLEASURE                   | 9) SOCIAL RECOGNITION |
| 10) WISDOM            | 11) SALVATION                 | 12) FAMILY SECURITY   |
| 13) NATIONAL SECURITY | 14) A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT | 15) A WORLD OF BEAUTY |
| 16) A WORLD OF PEACE  | 17) A COMFORTABLE LIFE        | 18) AN EXCITING LIFE  |

As the name suggests, INSTRUMENTAL values specify means of achieving TERMINAL values. Surprisingly enough, Rokeach's INSTRUMENTAL values consist exclusively of modes of behaviour, abilities and personality traits. Here is the complete list:

- 1) cheerfulness 2) ambition 3) love 4) cleanliness 5) self-control 6) capability
- 7) courage 8) politeness 9) honesty 10) imagination 11) independence
- 12) intellect 13) broad-mindedness 14) logic 15) obedience 16) helpfulness
- 17) responsibility 18) forgiveness.

What seems strange is that Rokeach's list of INSTRUMENTAL values leaves out those natural categories of entities which are used by humans to achieve their values, e.g. mountains, rivers, forests, etc. which may be considered as valuable because they enable people to achieve a number of terminal values such as INNER HARMONY, PLEASURE, A WORLD OF BEAUTY and AN EXCITING LIFE, to name a few. Furthermore, there are also non-natural categories that have been ignored, which have been created by humans precisely because they helped to achieve their values. The two main categories in this area are artefacts and institutions. To give just two examples, in the category of ARTEFACTS, the main function of tools is to serve the value of A COMFORTABLE LIFE and a few others like PLEASURE, A WORLD OF BEAUTY or AN EXCITING LIFE, while in the category of INSTITUTIONS, the university has been created in order to promote such values as WISDOM, A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT, AN EXCITING LIFE, etc. These brief comments show that while the division of all values into TERMINAL and INSTRUMENTAL ones seems to be justified, Rokeach's account of INSTRUMENTAL – values should be considerably extended.

### 3.2.2 Schwartz Theory of Basic Values

In the first version of his Theory of Basic Values,<sup>9</sup> Schwartz (2012, 2016) distinguished ten “motivational types of values” divided into four groups reflecting four psychological tendencies, or, rather, two pairs of psychological oppositions, namely, OPENNESS TO CHANGE vs. CONSERVATION, and SELF-ENHANCEMENT vs. SELF-TRANSCENDENCE. Each value is defined in terms of its main goal. The particular categories of values and their goals as specified by Schwartz, are presented below:

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<sup>9</sup> An extended version of the theory, consisting of 19 values, was proposed in Schwartz (2017) and discussed in Schwartz and Cieciuch (2022).

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**OPENNES TO CHANGE:**

SELF-DIRECTION

Goal: independent thought and action – choosing, creating, exploring

STIMULATION

Goal: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life

HEDONISM

Goal: pleasure or sensuous gratification of oneself

**SELF-ENHANCEMENT:**

ACHIEVEMENT

Goal: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards

POWER

Goal: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources

**CONSERVATION:**

SECURITY

Goal: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self

CONFORMITY

Goal: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms

TRADITION

Goal: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion provides

**SELF-TRANSCENDENCE:**

BENEVOLENCE

Goal: preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the "in-group")

UNIVERSALISM

Goal: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature

In the discussion of his theory and results of studies of value priorities, Schwartz (2012) observes that values are ordered by importance and it is the relative importance of different values that guides our decisions and actions. One of the most interesting findings of those studies is that, although there is a lot of individual and cultural variation, "there is surprising consensus regarding the hierarchical order of the values. In particular, BENEVOLENCE, UNIVERSALISM, and SELF-DIRECTION are most important, while POWER

and STIMULATION are least important". Trying to explain this "pan-cultural hierarchy of values", Schwartz suggests that "it probably derives from the adaptive functions of values in maintaining societies and from our common human nature" (p.14). He argues that they function by, firstly, serving as "internalized guidelines for individuals" and, secondly, by defining particular behaviours as socially appropriate and eliciting, thereby, desirable behaviours which lead to survival and prosperity. This indicates that the universally most important values of BENEVOLENCE, UNIVERSALISM, and SELF-DIRECTION should be included in the repertoire of basic adaptive concepts discussed in section 1.5. above.

The weakness of Schwartz's theory and typology for the purposes of linguistic description lies in that his values are defined in terms of their motivational content and, naturally, most of them are based on the basic human needs based on the biological need to survive as an individual, society and species. Thus the main difference between Schwartz and Scheler's values is that while Schwartz system is limited to survival or, using Maslow's terms, deficiency values, philosophical systems, like Maslow's, allow also for growth values, such as COGNITIVE, AESTHETIC, and TRANSCENDENT values. Since all sorts of values are represented as lexical categories, for linguistic purposes, the broader philosophical system is preferable, although, as Puzynina (1992) discussed below pointed out, for descriptive purposes, Scheler's and Tischner's category of SPIRITUAL values should be divided into experientially three separate domains, namely, COGNITIVE, AESTHETIC, and MORAL values.

## 4 Values in linguistics

There are two relatively recent systems of values used in linguistic descriptions. One was proposed by Puzynina (1992)<sup>10</sup> and the other by Krzeszowski (1997).

### 4.1 Puzynina's typology of values

Based both on psychological and philosophical traditions, particularly those of Rokeach (1973), Ingarden (1966) and Scheler (1913-1916/1973), Puzynina distinguished the following types of values: TRANSCENDENT, COGNITIVE, AESTHETIC, MORAL, CULTURAL, VITAL, AND SENSORY, where each category is defined in terms of its conceptual centre:

- a) TRANSCENDENT VALUES – TRANSCENDENT GOOD, SACREDNESS
- b) COGNITIVE VALUES – TRUTH

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<sup>10</sup> Puzynina discusses other systems as well, e.g. that of Zillig (1982).

- c) AESTHETIC VALUES – BEAUTY
- d) MORAL VALUES – GOOD OF OTHER HUMAN BEINGS
- e) CULTURAL VALUES – TRADITION
- f) VITAL VALUES – ONE’S OWN LIFE
- g) SENSORY VALUES – ONE’S PLEASURE, HAPPINESS

These categories were further divided into two broad categories, namely INSTRUMENTAL and ULTIMATE on one hand, and POSITIVE and NEGATIVE on the other. Thus, the final form of Puzynina’s typology looks as follows:

1. POSITIVE values
  - 1.1. INSTRUMENTAL
  - 1.2. ULTIMATE
2. NEGATIVE values
  - 2.1. INSTRUMENTAL
  - 2.2. ULTIMATE (p.39)

In the light of Schwartz’s Theory of Basic Values (Schwartz, 2011), it seems that Puzynina’s category of CULTURAL values is too narrow and I suggest it should be extended and include the subcategory of personal values alongside more general social values and renamed as PERSONAL/ SOCIAL values. Furthermore, as we will see below, the need for distinguishing POSITIVE and NEGATIVE values disappears if particular kinds of values are construed as conceptual domains structured by the image schema of scale with different intensities of pluses and minuses.

#### 4.2 Krzeszowski’s cognitive account of values

Krzeszowski (1997) based his hierarchy of values on The Great Chain of Being (henceforth GCB) - a model of the world as it is perceived and experienced by humans, which goes back to Plato and Aristotle’s *History of Animals*, which finally led to its medieval Christian version, on the one hand, whereby the chain descends from God to angels, humans, animals, plants and minerals, and to Linnaeus’ division of the physical world into three kingdoms of minerals, plants and animals, on the other, more “scientific”, hand.<sup>11</sup> In order to account for unique human attributes and beliefs, Krzeszowski used the “extended” version of the GCB, which includes God and argued that each level of the chain has its own defining characteristics linked to particular categories of values based on human experiences. Thus, the GCB may be interpreted as the conceptual basis for Scheler’s and Tischner’s hierarchy of values. As Krzeszowski put it “all values are derived from the existential properties at various levels of the Chain through various kinds of experience at

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<sup>11</sup> An extensive history of the GCB in European philosophy from classical antiquity to the nineteenth-century romanticism is discussed in considerable detail by Lovejoy (1936).

the corresponding levels” (p.72). Table 2 below shows the relations between the five levels of the GCB and their properties, as well as the existential and experiential values associated with each level.

Table 2

*The Great Chain of Being in relation to values viewed existentially and experientially*

The GCB	Unique properties	Values viewed existentially	Values viewed experientially
God	absolute	DIVINE	RELIGIOUS
Humans	reason, higher emotions, moral judgements, self-awareness	HUMAN	SPIRITUAL
Animals	instincts, lower emotions	ANIMATE	EMOTIONAL
Plants	life	VITAL	BODILY, MOTOR
Physical	material substance	PHYSICAL	SENSORY

Source: based on Krzeszowski 1997:74.

What is interesting about Krzeszowski’s model is that it links values to evolution, and thus it explains why particular kinds of values can only apply to certain ontological categories, e.g. why we can predicate fast growth of grass but not of stones, moral evil of people but not of fish, etc. What is less convincing is that the column “Values viewed existentially” indicates that values have some sort of objective autonomous existence, whereas they are just human concepts derivable from human needs and the embodied ability to distinguish between good and bad for the human survival and growth. Therefore, some of the lower ontological categories, i.e. physical entities, plants, and (unfortunately) animals may only be viewed as UTILITARIAN (or INSTRUMENTAL) values helping humans to achieve their ABSOLUTE values. For instance, stones and trees are used as building materials or weapons for the sake of the value of SECURITY, plants and animals are used as food for the sake of the values of LIFE, but also HEDONISM, STIMULATION, and even POWER, as in the war in Ukraine. Another weakness of Krzeszowski’s proposal is that, except for mentioning the broad concept of MORALITY, it ignores the social aspect of life, which appears on the animal level being and becomes one of the key domains of human and religious levels. The values which are rooted in the needs of belonging, love and esteem are nearly all SELF-TRANSCENDENCE and CONSERVATION Values of Schwartz system, i.e. UNIVERSALISM, BENEVOLENCE, CONFORMITY, TRADITION, AND SECURITY.

### 4.3 A compromise proposal

The hierarchy of values I propose, which brings together the proposals of philosophers, psychologists and linguists, is shown below as Fig.1. Most of

the basic values in Schwartz system are included in the PERSONAL & SOCIAL category of values, except for ACHIEVEMENT and STIMULATION, which may also apply to AESTHETIC, COGNITIVE and even SPIRITUAL & RELIGIOUS values, and HEDONISM, included in SENSORY values.

Although it is represented as a hierarchy, it may also be interpreted as flexible and interconnected framework, which each person may arrange in a different way depending on their culture, upbringing, education, sensitivity, interests and current needs. There are also obvious links and fuzzy areas between particular categories of values which Fig.1 fails to show, e.g. the link between SENSORY and AESTHETIC values, the links between MORAL values and RELIGIOUS values, on the one hand, and PERSONAL&SOCIAL values, on the other. Some of these problems are discussed by Puzynina (1992) and Bierwiazeczek (in preparation).




Fig. 1

My own proposal representing the structure and basic categories of values, combing the insights of philosophers and linguists and empirical results of psychologists.

Table 3 below shows a few more-or-less prototypical simple examples of negatively and positively loaded predications, B-predications and G-predications, respectively, based on particular categories of values and their corresponding UTILITARIAN values.

Table 3

Examples of B- and G-predications based on particular categories of values and corresponding UTILITARIAN values

Category of values	B-predications	G-predications	UTILITARIAN
TRANSCENDENT	<i>sin, hell, temptation</i>	<i>grace, heaven, blessing</i>	<i>church, temple, prayer</i>
MORAL	<i>evil, pervert, murder</i>	<i>honest, decent, charitable, loyal</i>	<i>reward, punishment, court of law</i>
AESTHETIC	<i>ugly, disharmonious, unbalanced</i>	<i>beautiful, harmonious, balanced</i>	<i>museum, gallery, concert hall</i>

Table 3 (cont.)

Category of values	B-predications	G-predications	UTILITARIAN
COGNITIVE	<i>false, wrong, stupid</i>	<i>true, right, intelligent</i>	<i>school, university, library, laboratory</i>
PERSONAL & SOCIAL	<i>failure, irresponsible, unreliable, violent, selfish</i>	<i>success, family, responsible, reliable, friendly</i>	<i>home, work, holiday, tradition</i>
SENSORY	<i>pain, smell, noise, delicious</i>	<i>pleasure, delicious, comfortable</i>	<i>furniture, restaurant, dessert</i>
VITAL	<i>death, disease, sick, weak</i>	<i>life, healthy, strong, safe</i>	<i>food, drink, house, farm, hospital</i>

#### 4.4 Values as profiles in conceptual domains

In Bierwiazzonek (1990, 1993) I suggested that particular categories of values serve as conceptual domains, called also “axiological domains”, for evaluative predications, construed as profiles in those domains. In the cases when evaluative predications denote more specific aspects of values, their concepts may be represented as profiles in one of the dimensions of the particular axiological domain. For instance, while *evil* should be represented as a profile in the negative side of the domain of MORAL values, the predicate *pervert* profiles a region in the negative side of the dimension of SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR. What is crucial for our considerations is that all axiological domains and dimensions have the bipolar scalar structure of the most general and schematic axiological domain profiling the concepts of GOOD and BAD based on the embodied bi-polar scales. In fact, this most general AXIOLOGICAL domain serves as the base for a number of predications with an unspecified kind of value, such as e.g. *success* vs. *failure* or *improvement, progress, amendment, etc.* vs. *deterioration, decline, degeneration, throw-back, etc.* (cf. Bierwiazzonek, 1993). Consequently, the schematic representation of the meaning of the nominal *success* is shown in Fig.2 below.




Fig. 2

Representation of the meaning of the nominal *success* construed as a process with a positive result. The letters A, P, and J stand respectively for Agent, Patient, and Judge responsible for the evaluation

Of course it must be borne in mind that the axiological domain is usually one of other conceptual domains in the domain matrix of particular predicates and predications (cf. Langacker, 1987). For instance, one of the meanings of the noun *beauty* in English profiles regions in the domain of LIVING THINGS and the axiological domain of AESTHETIC values, illustrated by the BNC sentences below and represented in Fig.3.

- 14) Barry is the first to admit that most movie stars are a bit of a letdown in the flesh. But **beauties** like Sophia Loren and Michelle Pfeiffer bring a sparkle to his baggy eyes.
- 15) If you don't have a pond you may have missed out on our series on waterlilies. But in a conservatory of large fishtanks you could be keeping your own tropical **beauties**.




Fig. 3

Semantic structure of the nominal *beauty* in the sense of 'beautiful living thing, where the geometric shapes in the domain of LIVING THINGS may be interpreted as various categories of LIVING THINGS, such as PLANTS, ANIMALS and PEOPLE

## Concluding remarks

My purpose in this paper was to propose bodily motivation of the basic evaluative terms GOOD and BAD in terms of adaptive human experiences (sensations) of pain and pleasure and the related emotions, based on the findings and theory of human emotions and feelings proposed by A. Damasio (1999). What this fundamental axiological opposition has inherited from the bodily experiences of pain and pleasure are bi-polarity and scalarity, which both determine the structure of two more specific evaluative systems: emotions and values. I tried to show that emotion concepts and values are two fundamental sources of evaluative predications, called respectively affective and value predications, i.e. a-predications and v-predications. A-predications predications derive their evaluative valence and intensity from the emotions they denote, e.g. the adjective *annoying* derives its negative charge

from the negativity of ANGER, while v-predications derive their axiological charge from the values they refer to, e.g. the positive charge of the adjective *pretty* is motivated by the positive value of BEAUTY in the domain of AESTHETIC values. The proposed new hierarchy of values, conceived as the general AXIOLOGICAL domain may serve as the basis for profiling lexical concepts in more specific axiological domains and dimensions and may be used in further studies of evaluative aspects of language.

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